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The gender of the household head has often been treated as an exogenous 
determinant of homeownership. This paper argues that several determinants of 
homeownership also affect household headship and that failing to explicitly 
account for this endogeneity leads to inconsistent results. Using individual level 
data for Chile, Honduras and Nicaragua, the paper shows that although on average 
women have lower probability of being homeowners, women who head 
households (single, separated or divorced) have a greater probability of attaining 
homeownership. Thus household level analysis should control for the endogeneity 
of household headship in order to properly address the gender effect on housing 
tenure. Estimating a bivariate probit model, the paper finds evidence that female- 
headed families have a lower probability of owning their home in Latin American 




                                                           
* This paper was undertaken as part of the Latin American and Caribbean Research Network Project 
“Discrimination and Economic Outcomes.”   4
1. Introduction 
As stated in IDB (2004) “Poverty is both cause and effect of poor housing conditions. Lack of 
effective demand resulting from the low income of households is the underlying cause that 
prevents the private provision of houses…. Conversely, improving housing conditions can have a 
major influence on poverty alleviation through improvements in the living standards of low 
income families, and on poverty reduction via increased employment opportunities.” Therefore, 
understanding the determinants of housing tenure and potential gender discrimination is 
important for poverty reduction policies.  
The determinants of housing tenure and concerns with possible discrimination have been 
on the research agenda even before appropriate econometric techniques became commonly used. 
Li (1977) is the first paper that goes beyond linear models and estimates a logit model of the 
determinants of homeownership, but this study does not consider the gender of the household 
head.  
Several types of variables have received most of the attention of the researchers: income 
and wealth, life cycle status, location and neighborhood attributes and a variety of 
socioeconomic indicators. In particular, much attention has been given to the racial or ethnic 
origin of the father. There is substantial evidence of racial discrimination in access to mortgage 
credit and homeownership.  
The gender economic discrimination literature has also devoted considerable attention to 
studying the existence of discrimination in dimensions such as salaries and promotions. One 
common strategy is to include an explanatory variable indicating the presence of women and to 
conclude that if the estimated coefficient is significantly different from zero, females or female- 
headed households receive discriminatory (positive or negative) treatment. It is therefore striking 
find a dearth of comments on gender differentials in studies of the determinants of 
homeownership. The reason is that most studies find more favorable outcomes for 
female=headed families or do not find significant results at all.
1 Given the outcomes, in other 
contexts, of the gender discrimination literature these results are surprising. We argue that the 
                                                           
1 Van Leuvensteijn and Koning (2004) and Gandelman and Gandelman (2004) find that female headed households 
have higher probabilities of owning their household in the Netherlands and Uruguay respectively. Chiuri and 
Jappelli (2003) and Arimah (1997) do not find gender differences in fourteen OECD countries and Nigeria 
respectively. Manrique and Ojah (2003) find that in Spain male-headed households are more likely to own their 
household but female headed households tend to have higher household expenditures.    5
determinants of women’s household headship and those of homeownership are correlated and 
therefore the specification used in most studies has an endogeneity problem that leads to 
inconsistent and often counterintuitive results.  
If female household headship is not exogenous to the tenure choice, then, even in the 
presence of lower probabilities of homeownership, a naive view of the data may reflect that 
women-headed households have higher probabilities of owning their home. For instance, women 
who have lower income, more children, etc., will probably not divorce their husbands even if 
they want to. There is a selection bias in which women-headed families tend to have better 
socioeconomic indicators than what they would have if female headship were a completely 
random process. Thus, the gender of the household head cannot be treated in the same way as 
other truly exogenous characteristics like race and ethnic origin.  
To the best of our knowledge this is the first paper that focuses on the factors affecting 
homeownership and household headship jointly by explicitly providing an econometric solution 
to the endogeneity issues that arise from the joint determination of both variables. Our results for 
17 Latin American countries show that the biases are important and that female-headed families 
have a substantially lower probability of attaining homeownership. 
 
2. Data 
Thanks to the collaboration of the MECOVI
2 program and the corresponding national institutes 
of statistics we were able to have access to the household surveys of 17 Latin American 
countries. The countries included in this study are: Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, 
Ecuador, Peru, Paraguay, Uruguay and Venezuela from South America; Costa Rica, El Salvador, 
Guatemala, Honduras, Nicaragua and Panama from Central America; and Mexico. Table A1 in 
the Appendix presents detailed information on the data sources.  
Table 1 presents the housing tenure structure for the countries covered in this study. 
Argentina is the only country that does not distinguish those that own their house and are still 
paying for it from those who have already finished paying. On average, 72 percent of all 
                                                           
2 MECOVI is short for “Programa para el Mejoramiento de las Encuestas y la Medición de Condiciones de Vida,” 
the Spanish translation for the Program for Improvement of the Surveys of Living Conditions. MECOVI is a 
regional program of technical assistance for capacity building to improve the household surveys to measure living 
conditions and poverty in Latin America and the Caribbean that was jointly launched in 1996 by IDB, World Bank 
and UN-ECLAC.   6
households own their home, 14 percent rent and 13 percent use a house with or without owners’ 
approval. Venezuela, Panama, Paraguay and Nicaragua have the highest shares of homeowners 
and the lowest shares of renters. Colombia is the opposite case, with the lowest ownership ratio. 
This may in part be due to the internal forced migration that many Colombians have faced in 
recent decades. The mortgage market seems to be more developed in Chile, Costa Rica, Panama 
and Uruguay, the only countries where more than 10 percent of households own their home but 
are still paying for it.
3  
 
Table 1. Housing Tenure 
  
Own, already paid  Own, still paying  Rent  User with or without 
owner approval  Cases 
Argentina 72.6%  14.8%  12.6%  26,285 
Bolivia  61.2% 2.2% 16.2%  20.4%  4,832 
Brazil  69.7% 4.5% 14.8%  11.1%  107,840 
Chile  61.8% 10.4% 11.2% 16.6%  68,153 
Colombia  45.7% 6.8% 34.3%  13.2%  22,949 
Costa  Rica  65.1% 10.3% 13.4% 11.2%  11,032 
Ecuador 63.2% 4.7% 17.8%  14.3%  18,959 
El  Salvador  64.2% 5.6% 11.2%  19.1%  16,808 
Guatemala  59.9% 1.8% 18.6%  19.7%  2,784 
Honduras  69.2% 3.7% 13.4%  13.7%  7,983 
Mexico  67.3% 5.9% 14.0%  12.8%  22,130 
Nicaragua  77.0% 0.6%  3.2% 19.2%  4,171 
Panama  67.3% 11.0% 10.0% 11.7%  6,344 
Paraguay  76.6% 1.3%  8.4% 13.7%  9,591 
Peru  68.9% 0.4% 10.2%  20.5%  2,163 
Uruguay  57.3% 10.6% 16.8% 15.3%  18,338 
Venezuela  74.8%  6.2% 9.7% 9.3%  46,287 
        Source: Authors’ compilation based on countries’ household surveys. 
 
 
                                                           
3 In Uruguay, the state-owned Banco Hipotecario del Uruguay has a market share of more than 80 percent of all 
mortgage housing credit (Gandelman and Gandelman, 2004). As a result of a severe financial crisis in 2002, this 
source of home finance is no longer available.    7
3.  Data Measurement Problems 
 
3.1 Household Headship 
 
There are potential difficulties in measuring the two main variables of our analysis. First, the 
status of household head is self-declared, and the definition of household headship is not 
homogeneous across countries. Female household headship does not necessary imply that the 
marital status of the woman of the house is divorced. In principle, a woman household head 
could be single, married, divorced or a widow. But given the household self-declaration of 
headship, it is not surprising that in practice in Latin America there are very few cases of married 
female household heads. To deal with this issue we explored the use of alternative “objective” 
definitions of household headship (e.g., assigning the household headship to the main income 
provider). We found no significant differences in the main results of the paper.  
The endogeneity stressed in this paper has to do with the explicit decision of women to 
head their family. Naturally, single mothers and divorced or separated women are examples of 
such women. The decision to head the family may be the result of a woman divorcing her 
husband, but not all divorced or separated women wanted to end their marriage. Even in those 
cases where the husband ends the marriage, the woman has the possibility of remarrying or 
moving in with other family members. Less clear is the case of widows. First, although widows 
are female household heads, they became so only after the passing of their partner. Therefore, 
with the exception of criminal cases, women do not choose to become widows. But it could also 
be argued, as in the case of divorced women, that widows decide to continue living on their own, 
i.e. not to remarry or to live with some other family member. Even if remarrying is not a 
possibility for many widows (nor for many divorcees or separated women) and there are no 
family members or friends willing to live with or take care of them, those widows who end up 
heading their own household are those who managed to make a living on their own, caring for 
children on their own, etc., and these characteristics are likely to be correlated with 
homeownership.
4 
                                                           
4 In previous versions of this paper we dropped widows from our sample and the results were qualitatively similar to 
those presented here.   8
3.2 Homeownership in Household Data  
 
A second measurement problem is that for most countries homeownership is not observed at the 
individual level but only at the household level, i.e., we do not know which member of the 
family is the legal owner of the house. Therefore our analysis, like most of the homeownership 
literature, has to be carried out at the household level rather than the individual level, as is more 
traditional in discrimination analysis.  
When the estimation is carried out at the household level, the gender dummy will equal 
one in the presence of a female household head. The problem is that household headship is not 
exogenous. For instance, there is evidence that divorces are affected by several income and 
welfare variables. Shroder (2002) reviews the evidence on indirect effects of housing assistance 
on the self-sufficiency of assisted families. He concludes that there is a strong association of 
housing assistance with single-adult household formations. Other papers that report similar 
evidence include Danzinger et al. (1982) and Hannan and Tuma (1990). It is therefore natural to 
assume that some of the variables that increase the probability of owning a house also increase 
the probability of observing women-headed families. If this endogeneity is neglected the 
estimation is inconsistent.  
 
3.3 Three Examples Using Individual and Household-Level Data 
 
The traditional approach to estimating the determinants of homeownership is to postulate a 
structural equation  
i i i x Own ε β + = '
*   
where  0   if   1 > =
* Own Own  and ε  is an error term assumed to distribute normal or logistic. All 
explanatory variables in x are assumed to be exogenous.  
We are in the presence of gender differential effects, if all other things equal, females or 
female-headed households have a lower probability of owning their home. In order to test this 
gender differential treatment, one of the regressors would be a gender dummy. When the 
estimation is carried out at the individual level there are no problems with the gender variable 
since sex, like race or ethnic origin, is not a choice variable and could be taken as exogenous.  
The only three countries where we could obtain data on the actual owner of the house 
were Chile, Honduras and Nicaragua. Column A and B use individual data and column C uses   9
household-level data.
5 As expected, richer, older, married and more educated people are more 
likely to own their home. After controlling for these variables, the Woman coefficients reported 
in columns A and C seem to contradict each other. The explanation for such a contradiction, 
though, appears in column B.  
Column A and C report the “average” gender marginal effect on the probability of 
homeownership. Column A implies that the probability of women’s owning a home is lower than 
the probability for men for the three countries. But this result is not homogenous for all types of 
women. In column B, we desegregate the gender effect by “types” of women. In particular, we 
distinguish single women heading a family, single women not heading a family (e.g., daughters 
living with their parents), women living with her couple (married or not), divorced or separated 
women and finally widows. After disaggregating the analysis, we observe that separated women 
or single female household heads have a higher probability of owning their home. For Nicaragua 
this is also true for widows. Thus, although we have already established in these three countries 
that women have a lower probability of owning their home, when estimating a column A type of 
regression using data aggregated at the household level, we will only capture the effect of those 
females that became household heads. The results in column C are not the true gender effect; it 
instead reflects the fact that those women who felt they could head their family have a greater 
probability of achieving ownership. 
                                                           
5 Table A2 in the Appendix reports the estimated coefficients and standard errors.    10
  Table 2. Probability of Homeownership, Marginal Effects 
 Chile  Honduras  Nicaragua 



















Woman  -0.0067***  0.0545*** -0.0234***   -0.0113  -0.0487***  0.0732***
Woman-Single- 
Not household head 
   -0.0148***      -0.0410***      -0.1338***  
Woman-Single-  
household head 
 0.0028     0.0533***     0.2113*   
Woman Separated    0.0123***     0.0275**      0.0838***  
Woman  Couple   -0.0072***    -0.0227***    -0.0663***  
Woman Widow    -0.0057**     0.0053      0.0530**   
Income 0.0182***  0.0179*** 0.0379*** 0.0010*** 0.0007*** 0.0018*  0.0166***  0.0143*** 0.0017 
Age 0.0014***  0.0013*** 0.0081*** 0.0035*** 0.0027*** 0.0104*** 0.0091***  0.0076*** 0.0064***
Married 0.0067***  0.0079*** 0.1182*** 0.0270*** 0.0371*** 0.1232*** 0.0705***  0.1093*** 0.0864***
Schooling 0.0045***  0.0044*** -0.0120*** 0.0014*** 0.0012*** -0.0082***  0.0020**  0.0019**  -0.0027 
           
Observations  147,056  147,056  67,954  29,212  29,212 6,275 15,703  15,703 4,169 
Note: In columns A and B Own=1 if individual owns the house, Wom=1 for females, Married=1 if the individual 
is married, Schooling is years of  formal education. In column C Own=1 if someone in the household owns the 
house, Wom=1 if the household head is female, Age, Married and Schooling refers to the household head. 





Since for most countries the information about homeownership is at the household level rather 
than the individual level (i.e., we know if a member of the household owns the house but not 
whom), we need to provide a remedy for the endogeneity that arises in  household-level analysis. 
Therefore, to estimate the differential effect of gender household headship we postulate a 
bivariate probit model in which it is possible to test whether female headship and housing tenure 
are exogenous. The model is based on two structural equations. 
i i i i i Woman z x Own 1   1 1 1 1
* ' ' ε δ γ β + + + =  
  ' ' 2 2 2 2 2
*
i i i i Own z x Woman
i ε δ γ β + + + =  
where 
* Own  and 
* Woman  are latent variables, Own and Woman are dichotomous variables that 









otherwhise   0
0   if   1
        
otherwhise   0







x,  1 z and  2 z  are vectors of exogenous variables,  1 β , 2 β , 1 γ  and  2 γ  are vector of parameters,  1 δ  
and  2 δ  area scalar parameters and the error terms are assumed to be distributed bivariate normal   11
with mean 0, variance 1 and correlation  ( ) ρ ε ε =   ,   2 1 Cov . While the bivariate probit model can 
be identified based on the functional form assumptions of the joint normal distribution, this is a 
weak form of identification and it is desirable to have a more explicit identification strategy. 
Fortunately, some of the determinants of homeownership should not affect the gender headship 
regression and vice versa. The validity of the instruments depends on two conditions: whether 
the variables in  1 z  and  2 z  are sufficiently correlated with Own and Woman and whether the 
exclusions of variables are legitimate.  
The exclusion restrictions in this paper come from the fact that homeownership is likely 
to be a family decision, while female headship is a personal decision. For example, the 
purchasing power of a household is determined by the total income of all its members, therefore 
household income should be related to homeownership. Female income, although correlated with 
total household income, is on average a minor percentage of it, and so it could be excluded from 
the homeownership regression. On the other hand, females with more income are more likely to 
feel secure and confident on their ability to head their family so it should be included in the 
headship regression. In our regressions we also include age and education variables, but in the 
homeownership regression they are instrumented with the age and schooling of the household 
head (male or female), and in the female headship regression we use data for the woman of the 
house (household head or household head’s companion). 
As shown in Greene (1998) and Greene (2003), despite the endogeneity of female 
headship, a multiple equation specification for two dichotomous variables like the previous one 
can be consistently estimated by Full-Information Maximum Likelihood (FIML) methods. The 
intuition behind this result is that the four probability terms that enter the likelihood function can 
be decomposed into the conditional and the marginal distribution for women. For instance, 
() ) 1 ( ) 1 1 (   1 1 = = = = = = Woman P Woman Own P ,Woman Own P . 
The loglikelihood function to be maximized is given by: 
() [ ] ∑ + + + =
N
i








11 β l  
where:   12
( ) ( )
() ( ) ( )
() ( ) ( )
() ( ) ( ) ( ) ρ β β
ρ β β
ρ β γ β
ρ β γ β
, ' , ' 0 0                1 1
, ' , ' 1 0                       1
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, ' , ' 1 1                              
2 2 1 1
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00
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i i i i i i
i i i i i i
i i i i i i
i i i i i i
x x ,Woman Own P P Woman Own d
x x ,Woman Own P P Woman Own d
x x ,Woman Own P P Woman Own d
x x ,Woman Own P P Woman Own d
− − Φ = = = = − − =
− Φ = = = = − =
− + Φ = = = = − =
+ Φ = = = = =
 
and  () ρ .,., i Φ  is the bivariate normal distribution assumed for the perturbations. 
This nice result of the bivariate probit model has already been used in empirical work in 
various areas. Greene (1998) studies the probability of gender economic courses at Liberal Arts 
Colleges, White and Wolaver (2003) focus on occupation choice and migration and Greene, 
Rhine and Toussaint-Comeau (2006) study the decision to patronize check-cashing businesses 
and the decision to be unbanked.  
 
5.  Basic Statistics at the Household Level 
 
There may be important differences in housing tenure and in female headship decisions between 
urban and rural areas. In this paper, whenever possible we wanted to restrict attention to urban 
areas. The household surveys of Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Ecuador, Paraguay, Peru, Costa Rica, 
Guatemala, Honduras and Panama have a specific variable that allows differentiating between 
urban and rural areas. In Argentina, Colombia, Nicaragua and Uruguay, due to lack of more 
detailed information we restricted our analysis to households living in the capital city.
6 In 
Mexico we used data for all cities of more than 2,500 habitants. Finally, for Venezuela and El 
Salvador we were unable to differentiate households according to their location and ended up 
using the whole sample for each country.  
Tables 3 and 4 present descriptive statistics of variables likely to affect the probability of 
becoming a homeowner and the probability of a woman to head her own household. Some of the 
variables are for the household as a whole, some are characteristics of the household head and 
some are characteristics of the woman of the household.  
The first two variables are the dependent variables of our model at the household level. 
Own and Woman are dummy variables. Own takes a value of one when the household owns the 
house where they live and 0 otherwise, while Woman takes a value of one when the household 
                                                           
6 For Argentina we used Gran Buenos Aires, including suburbs of the capital city.    13
head is a woman and 0 otherwise. Simply looking at the means, there are no sizeable differences 
in homeownership between male and female-headed households.  
The variables of interest can be classified in the following four categories: income, life-
cycle status, location and neighborhood attributes and other socioeconomic characteristics. We 
define two income-related variables: total household income (IncomeHouse) and total income of 
the woman of the house (IncomeWoman). In most countries, the household income of owners is 
higher than renters, the exceptions being Chile, Costa Rica, Nicaragua, Paraguay, Peru and 
Venezuela. The mean values of IncomeWoman and IncomeHouse imply that on average the 
income of the woman of the house accounts for approximately 30 percent of total income. 
Venezuela and Honduras are exceptional cases where the mean value of IncomeWoman is 55 
percent and 50 percent, respectively, of the mean value of total household income. When these 
averages are broken down according to head of household, it is found that when a man heads the 
household the share of women’s income in total household income is much lower (about 20 
percent) than when the household is headed by a woman. Women who potentially earn more 
money by themselves are likely to feel more independent and therefore this may affect the 
decision to remain married. This pattern is clear from the comparison in absolute terms of 
IncomeWoman for those women who are household heads and those who are not. For most 
countries the average income of women heading their household is about two times the income 
of women not heading their household. The exceptions are Panama, Mexico, and Nicaragua, 
where for the first two the average income of women heading their households is more than 30 
percent greater than the average income of spouses of male household heads. For Nicaragua this 
income difference is 12 percent. 
We considered three life-cycle status variables: age of the household head and age of the 
woman (AgeHead and AgeWoman), a dummy that takes a value of 1 if the household head is 
married and 0 otherwise (Married),
7 and the number of children under 18 years old in the house 
(Children). In female headed families AgeHead takes the same value of AgeWoman. In most 
Latin American countries owning a house is a family achievement that can be attained only after 
many years of effort, and our tables show that owners who are household heads and the women 
of the house are about 10 years older than renters and users. In couples, men are usually older 
                                                           
7 This variable could not be defined for Ecuador and Brazil.   14
than women and on average our data implies a difference between 2 and 4 years older (Uruguay 
being the minimum and Costa Rica the maximum).  
If a person does not believe his actual mate to be stable, he may not be interested in 
entering into a long-term contract as a housing mortgage credit or buying a household that could 
be considered a marital property in case of divorce or separation. He will prefer a more flexible 
housing solution like renting. The household head being married is a proxy for family stability. 
The majority of owners are married (figures going up to 65 percent and 63 percent for Mexico 
and Bolivia, respectively). In all countries considered, most of renters’ household heads are not 
married, and in only a few cases are most users married (the share of married household heads 
for users is above 50 percent only for Bolivia, Chile, Guatemala and Mexico). In regard to the  
household head gender dimension, only a very small proportion (in most countries below 15 
percent) of woman households heads are married; Paraguay is the exception, with the highest 
share of married female household heads (24 percent).  Also households headed by females tend 
to have fewer children than households where there is a couple present and the household head is 
a man.
8 
With respect to education we defined SchoolingHead and SchoolingWoman as the years 
of formal education of the household head or the woman of the house.
9 On average, owners are 
less educated than renters. Given the improvements in education levels over the last decades it is 
not surprising that the younger group is more educated than the older one.  
 
                                                           
8 It may be surprising that the average number of children is between 1 and 2, but it should be noted that this is the 
average number of children per household and not per family. 
9 Argentina only reports schooling levels and not actual years. We assume that those with primary incomplete attend 
three years, those that did not complete secondary school attended eight years, and those that did not complete 
university studies had 13 formal years of education. Finally, those with university degrees were assigned 16 years of 
schooling.    15
 
 
Table 3. Summary Statistics by Housing Tenure 
 Argentina  Bolivia  Brazil  Chile  Colombia  Costa  Rica 
  Own Rent Use  Tot Own Rent Use  Tot Own Rent Use  Tot  Own  Rent  Use  Tot Own Rent Use  Tot Own Rent  Use  Tot 
Own  100%  0%  0% 74%  100% 0%  0% 56%  100% 0%  0% 74%  100%  0%  0% 70%  100% 0%  0% 50%  100% 0%  0% 76% 
Woman  30% 29% 29% 30% 23% 26% 21% 23% 29% 30% 28% 29%  28%  23%  25% 27% 35% 33% 36% 34% 20%  21%  17% 20% 
IncomeHouse  975  894  590  919  2254 1667 1818 2029 1406 1347  748  1337  503  527  302  479  3553 2143 1497 2803  179  204  112  171 
IncomeWoman  372 390 193 353 676 555 509 613 440 467 253 428  109  131  70  107  1327  828 668  1072 36  43  20  34 
AgeHead  55.8 43.2 46.9 53.0 48.7 36.6 38.5 43.8 48.2 39.5 41.2 46.1  53.2  40.7  43.2 49.8 54.1 40.1 44.3 47.5 47.6  36.4  41.6 45.7 
Agewoman  53.6 41.4 43.8 50.8 45.7 34.6 35.8 41.2 45.3 36.9 38.6 43.4  50.5  38.2  40.6 47.3 51.2 37.6 41.6 44.9 43.3  32.9  36.5 41.4 
Married  53% 35% 40% 49% 63% 41% 52% 56%          60%  49%  52% 57% 46% 27% 27% 37% 57%  35%  38% 52% 
Children  0.8 0.8 1.2 0.8 2.0 1.8 1.9 1.9 1.2 1.1 1.3 1.2  1.2  1.3  1.3 1.2 0.9 1.2 1.2 1.1 1.6  1.6  1.8 1.6 
SchoolingHead  9.2  10.3  8.3 9.2 8.0 9.1 9.2 8.5 6.3 7.3 5.7 6.5  7.8  10.2 8.5 8.3 9.7 9.6 8.6 9.6 5.8  7.4  5.0 5.8 
SchoolingWoman  9.3  10.2  8.7 9.3 7.4 8.9 9.1 8.1 6.4 7.3 5.9 6.5  7.8  9.9  8.5 8.2 9.4 9.4 8.6 9.3 6.1  7.0  5.2 6.1 
 Ecuador  El  Salvador  Guatemala  Honduras  Mexico  Nicaragua 
  Own Rent Use  Tot Own Rent Use  Tot Own Rent Use  Tot  Own  Rent  Use  Tot Own Rent Use  Tot Own Rent  Use  Tot 
Own  100%  0%  0% 61%  100% 0%  0% 70%  100% 0%  0% 57%  100%  0%  0% 66%  100% 0%  0% 70%  100% 0%  0% 80% 
Woman  24% 23% 24% 24% 32% 35% 30% 32% 25% 27% 21% 25%  32%  30%  29% 31% 24% 26% 25% 25% 39%  45%  28% 38% 
IncomeHouse  524  515  310  495  7707 7553 3654 6917 5211 3862 3096 4480  9374  8196  5689 8718  11338 10147 7017  10573 4820 10269 2647 4682 
IncomeWoman  136  116  99  126  2576 2639 1468 2382 1188 1172  747  1100  4653  4216  2736 4352 4803 4597 3076 4548  952  5078  640  1062 
AgeHead  51.6 40.7 41.5 47.4 48.8 39.1 42.0 46.4 50.8 38.6 40.9 45.9  50.3  37.1  40.9 46.3 50.0 38.2 41.2 46.8 49.2  38.8  36.5 46.7 
Agewoman  48.2 37.5 38.3 44.2 45.1 36.2 38.0 42.8 47.3 36.0 38.4 42.8  46.6  34.0  37.2 42.8 47.0 35.6 39.0 44.1 45.9  35.2  33.1 43.5 
Married          39% 26% 25% 35% 55% 38% 52% 51%  44%  28%  29% 39% 65% 48% 54% 61% 35%  32%  22% 33% 
Children  1.8 1.8 1.9 1.8 4.5 3.8 3.8 4.3 1.1 0.9 1.1 1.1  2.1  1.9  2.0 2.1 1.4 1.4 1.5 1.4 5.1  4.0  4.0 4.9 
SchoolingHead  8.2 9.4 8.5 8.6 4.9 7.4 4.7 5.2 6.7 7.1 6.6 6.8  7.6  7.9  7.2 7.6 8.3 9.7 8.6 8.6 6.3  9.0  6.5 6.4 
SchoolingWoman  8.1 9.2 8.6 8.5 4.6 6.9 4.5 4.8 5.6 6.2 5.5 5.7  7.5  7.8  7.2 7.6 8.0 9.3 8.4 8.3 5.9  9.6  6.5 6.1 
 Panama  Paraguay  Peru  Uruguay  Venezuela 
  Own Rent Use  Tot Own Rent Use  Tot Own Rent Use  Tot  Own  Rent  Use  Tot Own Rent Use  Tot 
Own  100% 0%  0%  71% 99%  0%  0%  74%  100% 0%  22% 69% 100%  0%  0%  67%  100% 0%  0%  81% 
Woman  31% 30% 27% 30% 32% 36% 30% 32% 22% 26% 20% 22%  36%  36%  34% 36% 33% 28% 22% 31% 
IncomeHouse  893 693 494 807 162 266  55  165  2347  3376  1317  2235  18454 15289  9099  16587 232 322 196 237 
IncomeWoman  273 238 113 247  56  64  43  56  572  1278  437 629 7355 6462  3424  6665  130 169  91  131 
AgeHead  50.2 41.4 40.5 47.5 49.4 36.5 39.5 46.4 52.0 41.4 40.1 47.8  58.4  47.3  49.7 55.0 48.0 39.0 38.5 46.3 
Agewoman  47.2 38.9 37.1 44.6 46.2 33.8 35.8 43.5 48.8 38.4 37.5 44.8  56.4  45.5  47.3 53.1 45.0 35.9 34.1 43.2 
Married  38% 23% 23% 34% 57% 35% 37% 52% 54% 37% 37% 48%  52%  40%  44% 49% 36% 36% 24% 35% 
Children  1.3 1.2 1.8 1.4 1.8 1.5 1.7 1.8 1.9 2.0 1.8 1.9  0.6  0.7  1.2 0.7 4.6 3.7 3.6 4.4 
SchoolingHead  9.4  10.3  8.4 9.4 7.3 9.6 7.4 7.7 8.8  11.8  9.8 9.4 10.1 10.6 8.1 9.9 7.1  10.0  6.8 7.4 
SchoolingWoman  9.7  10.3  8.5 9.6 7.3 9.0 7.4 7.5 7.5  11.3  8.6 8.2 10.8 11.4 9.1  10.7  7.3  10.1  7.5 7.6 
Note: Own=1 if household owns the house. Wom=1 if household the head is female. IncomeHouse= total household income. IncomeWom= total income of the woman of the house. Age and Schooling are evaluated for the household head 
and the woman of the house. Schooling is years of education. Married=1 if household head is married. Children=amount of children under 18 in the house. Data for Argentina. Colombia. Nicaragua and Uruguay refer to the capital city. 
Venezuela and El Salvador include both urban and rural areas. For the rest of the countries we consider only households living in urban areas.  
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Table 4. Summary Statistics by Household Head 
 Argentina  Bolivia  Brazil  Chile  Colombia  Costa  Rica 
  Man  Wom Tot  Man  Wom Tot  Man    Wom Tot  Man  Wom Tot  Man  Wom Tot  Man  Wom Tot 
Own  74% 75% 74% 56% 55% 56% 74% 74% 74% 69% 73% 70% 50% 52% 50% 76% 78% 76% 
Wom  0%  100%  30% 0%  100%  23% 0%  100%  29% 0%  100%  27% 0%  100%  34% 0%  100%  20% 
IncomeHouse  1029  652  915  2153 1616 2029 1447 1070 1337  526  351  479  2882 2650 2803  178  139  170 
IncomeWom  260 560 355 463  1048  613 327 645 428  82  176 107 715  1634  1072 25  68  34 
AgeHead  50.8 57.5 52.9 42.6 47.8 43.8 44.4 50.2 46.1 48.0 54.8 49.8 46.4 49.4 47.5 44.9 48.1 45.5 
AgeWom  47.3 57.5 50.8 38.9 47.8 41.2 40.2 50.2 43.4 44.1 54.8 47.3 42.0 49.4 44.9 39.3 48.1 41.2 
Married  68%  6%  49% 68% 16% 56%        73% 12% 57% 51%  9%  37% 63%  7%  52% 
Children  0.9 0.6 0.8 2.1 1.4 1.9 1.2 1.0 1.2 1.3 1.0 1.2 1.1 0.9 1.1 1.6 1.5 1.6 
SchoolingHead  9.3 8.9 9.2 9.0 7.0 8.5 6.6 6.0 6.5 8.6 7.4 8.3 9.8 9.1 9.6 5.9 5.5 5.8 
SchoolingWom  9.5 8.9 9.3 8.5 7.0 8.1 6.7 6.0 6.5 8.5 7.4 8.2 9.5 9.1 9.3 6.3 5.5 6.1 
 Ecuador  El  Salvador  Guatemala  Honduras  Mexico  Nicaragua 
  Man  Wom Tot  Man  Wom Tot  Man  Wom Tot  Man  Wom Tot  Man  Wom Tot  Man  Wom Tot 
Own  61% 61% 61% 70% 70% 70% 56% 57% 57% 65% 67% 66% 69% 68% 68% 77% 83% 80% 
Wom  0%  100%  24% 0%  100%  32% 0%  100%  25% 0%  100%  31% 0%  100%  24% 0%  100%  38% 
IncomeHouse  546  330  495  7326 6034 6917 4756 3651 4480 9144 7627 8674  11110  8472  10465  5493 3342 4682 
IncomeWom  103  193  126  1813 3423 2382  887  1667 1100 3361 6489 4329 4001 5320 4522 1015 1132 1062 
AgeHead  46.4 50.7 47.4 44.8 49.8 46.4 44.5 50.1 45.9 44.7 49.4 46.1 45.1 50.8 46.5 44.3 50.7 46.7 
AgeWom  41.8 50.7 44.2 39.1 49.8 42.8 40.1 50.1 42.8 39.2 49.4 42.7 41.3 50.8 43.8 38.6 50.7 43.5 
Married        49%  6%  35% 64% 11% 51% 51% 10% 39% 76% 13% 61% 50%  6%  33% 
Children  1.8 1.8 1.8 4.4 3.9 4.3 1.1 1.0 1.1 2.1 1.9 2.0 1.5 1.2 1.4 4.9 4.9 4.9 
SchoolingHead  8.9 7.5 8.6 5.6 4.1 5.2 7.3 5.2 6.8 7.7 7.4 7.6 8.9 7.6 8.6 7.0 5.4 6.4 
SchoolingWom  8.8 7.5 8.5 5.2 4.1 4.8 5.9 5.2 5.7 7.6 7.4 7.6 8.6 7.6 8.3 6.6 5.4 6.1 
 Panama  Paraguay  Peru  Uruguay  Venezuela 
  Man  Wom Tot  Man  Wom Tot  Man    Wom  Total Man  Wom Tot  Man    Wom Tot 
Own  70% 73% 71% 74% 73% 74% 69% 67% 69% 66% 67% 67% 79% 85% 81% 
Wom  0%  100%  30% 0%  100%  32% 0%  100%  22% 0%  100%  36% 0%  100%  31% 
IncomeHouse  884 631 807 161 174 165  2317  1950  2235  18533  13116  16587  264 178 237 
IncomeWom  213 313 247  45  75  56  518 962 629  4916  9281  6665  105 179 131 
AgeHead  46.1 50.8 47.5 45.4 48.6 46.4 46.9 51.1 47.8 52.8 58.9 55.0 45.0 49.0 46.3 
AgeWom  41.5 50.8 44.6 40.6 48.6 43.5 42.8 51.1 44.8 49.2 58.9 53.1 40.0 49.0 43.2 
Married  46%  6%  34% 65% 24% 52% 60%  5%  48% 72%  8%  49% 47% 10% 35% 
Children  1.4 1.2 1.4 1.8 1.6 1.8 1.8 2.0 1.9 0.8 0.5 0.7 4.5 4.3 4.4 
SchoolingHead  9.5 9.3 9.4 8.0 6.9 7.7  10.0  7.4 9.4  10.0  9.9 9.9 7.5 7.0 7.4 
SchoolingWom  9.8 9.3 9.6 7.9 6.9 7.5 8.5 7.4 8.2  11.1  9.9  10.7  7.9 7.0 7.6 
   
 
Note: Own=1 if household owns the house. Wom=1 if household the head is a Wom. IncomeHouse= total household income. IncomeWom= total income of the Wom of the house. 
Age. Schooling and Illiteracy  are evaluated for the household head and the Wom of the house. Schooling is years of education.  Married=1 if household head is married. 
Children=amount of children under 18 in the house. Data for Argentina. Colombia. Nicaragua and Uruguay refer to the capital city. Venezuela and El Salvador include both urban and 
rural areas. For the rest of the countries we consider only households living in urban areas. 
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6. Results   
 
Table 5 presents the results of the traditional probit estimation for homeownership and female 
household headship. Table 6 presents the estimation of the bivariate probit model where we 
control for the endogeneity of woman headship.
10 With respect of the identification of the model 
we performed a test of joint significance of our instruments (excluded variables) in the bivariate 
probit model and rejected the null hypothesis of no effect in both equations.  
There are two differences in the ownership regression presented in Table 5 and in Table 
6: the simultaneous estimations in the case of the bivariate probit model and the number of 
observations included. Since the bivariate probit model can be run only when there is 
information for all variables in both equations, the number of observations in Table 6 is lower 
than in the ownership regression in Table 5 for all countries. In order to be sure that our results 
are not due to composition effects we run the simple probit models, restricting the set of 
observations to those considered in Table 6. The results are robust to this change in the set of 
observations. Thus, the differences in the estimations from the simple probits to the  bivariate 
probits must be due to the endogeneity control.  
The main methodological result of this section can be seen by the reverse of the sign of 
Women in the homeownership regressions for the cases of Argentina, Bolivia, Chile, Colombia, 
Costa Rica, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, Mexico, Nicaragua, Panama, Uruguay and 
Venezuela.  
According to the simple probit models there is a statistically significant better outcome in 
terms of ownership for women-headed households in Argentina, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, El 
Salvador, Mexico, Panama, Uruguay and Venezuela. The only countries where there is 
discrimination against female headed households at the traditional statistical significance levels 
are Brazil and Ecuador. On the contrary, the bivariate probit models show evidence of lower 
probability of homeownership for female household heads in all cases.  
The simple probit estimation results suggest in nine countries a more favorable outcome 
in terms of homeownership for female-headed families and a less favorable result for two 
countries; the results were inconclusive for six countries. When the bivariate probit model is 
used, there is significant evidence a lower probability of homeownership for female-headed in 
                                                           
10 Tables A3, A4, and A5 report the coefficient and standard error behind the marginal effects of Tables 5 and 6.   18
households not only the two countries that had previously shown worse conditions for women, 
but also for the five countries that were previously inconclusive and the nine countries where the 
results seemed to indicate a greater probability of homeownership by female-headed households. 
Therefore, in the bivariate probit model we recover the intuitive result that female-headed 
families are not in a better situation than husband-wife households in respect to homeownership.  
The rest of the variables present plausible results for most cases. In the simple probit 
model, for five countries the relation between income and ownership was not significant, and in 
Venezuela it was negative. The bivariate probit model presents more reasonable results. In all 
cases, the higher the income of the household the greater the members’ likelihood of becoming a 
homeowner. In both the simple probit model and the bivariate probit model we found in all 
countries the higher the income of the woman of the house, the greater the likelihood that she 
will head her own household.  
The life cycle variables also have the expected signs for most cases. The older the 
household head, the more likely he or she is to own his/her house (both in the probit and biprobit 
model the marginal effects are of similar magnitude). Family stability is also associated with less 
flexible housing tenure options as ownership. Being married significantly increases the 
probability of becoming a homeowner in the probit model, with a marginal effect around 0.13 
larger than the 0.05 marginal effect implied by the bivariate probit model. The difference in the 
marginal effects is probably due to the controls for female headed households in the bivariate 
probit model. Older women are more likely to become household heads; this result is robust to 
the exclusion of widows from the estimation sample. Therefore, it suggests that, even for those 
female household heads whose first option was a more traditional two-parent family, they choose 
to head their own family if they do not obtain that first choice. The number of children also is 
negatively related with the probability of female household head.  
With respect to education we found more counterintuitive results. In at least one of the 
estimation methods the schooling variable reflects that more education is associated with a 
higher probability of being a homeowner in Colombia, Uruguay, Argentina and Costa Rica. In 
contrast, in Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Ecuador, Mexico, Peru and Venezuela more education is 
associated with a lower probability of homeownership. In part this result may be produced by an 
increase in the level of education of young cohorts that have a lower probability of owning their 
home, as reflected in the age variable. We conjectured that more educated women have more   19
labor opportunities and therefore may feel less attached to an unsatisfactory marriage. This 
seems to be verified for Colombia and Uruguay but not for most of the other countries. 
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Table 5. Marginal Effects of the Probability of Homeownership and Woman Household Headship, Simple Probit Model 
 Argentina  Bolivia  Brazil  Chile  Colombia Costa Rica Ecuador  El Salvador Guatemala Honduras Mexico Nicaragua Panama  Paraguay Peru  Uruguay  Venezuela
Home ownership                    
Woman  0.0383*  0.0096 -0.0389***  0.0641*** 0.0563*** 0.0888*** -0.0306* 0.0263** 0.0237  0.0242 0.0333*** 0.0522 0.0613*** 0.0195  -0.0499 0.0409*** 0.0484*** 
IncomeHouse  0.0000  0.0336*** 0.0126*** 0.0696*** 0.0240*** 0.0075** 0.0416*** -0.0024  0.0504*** 0.0130  0.0473*** 0.0177*  0.0385*** -0.0015 0.0060  0.0490*** -0.0024***
AgeHead  0.0075*** 0.0125*** 0.0068*** 0.0092*** 0.0173*** 0.0068*** 0.0118*** 0.0058*** 0.0124*** 0.0141*** 0.0117*** 0.0090*** 0.0083*** 0.0083*** 0.0091*** 0.0092*** 0.0061*** 
Married  0.1401***  0.1533***  0.1260*** 0.1676*** 0.1697***  0.1387*** 0.1323*** 0.1502***  0.1631*** 0.1036**  0.1258*** 0.1612*** 0.0883** 0.1305*** 0.0556*** 
SchoolingHead  0.0074***  -0.0054**  -0.0012***  -0.0175*** 0.0100*** 0.0042*  -0.0015  -0.0010 0.0010 0.0016  -0.0030*** 0.0027 0.0028  -0.0065*** -0.0153*** 0.0109*** -0.0058***
C o n s t a n t                     
Observations  5222 3309  92195  42306  12236  5752  10452  16808  1983 3628  17318 548  3363 5035 1592  18338  45976 
Female headship                    
Own  -0.0949*** -0.1175*** -0.0973*** -0.0729*** -0.1319*** -0.0418** -0.0871*** -0.0747*** -0.0827*** -0.1296*** -0.1681*** -0.1108  -0.1051*** -0.1612*** -0.1316** -0.1135*** -0.0186** 
IncomeWoman  0.0733*** 0.0583*** 0.0633*** 0.0360*** 0.0364*** 0.0326*** 0.0653*** 0.0512*** 0.0623*** 0.0515*** 0.0777*** 0.0415*** 0.0489*** 0.0324*** 0.0507*** 0.0800*** 0.0236*** 
AgeWoman  0.0072*** 0.0061*** 0.0075*** 0.0071*** 0.0106*** 0.0050*** 0.0076*** 0.0085*** 0.0077*** 0.0092*** 0.0104*** 0.0172*** 0.0096*** 0.0067*** 0.0052*** 0.0075*** 0.0093*** 
Children  -0.0025 -0.0421***  -0.0055*** -0.0040 -0.0207*** 0.0081*  0.0001 -0.0351*** -0.0143  -0.0085 -0.0237*** -0.0123  -0.0042  -0.0087 0.0079  -0.0370*** -0.0228***
SchoolingWoman  -0.0121*** -0.0061*** -0.0093*** -0.0106*** -0.0072*** -0.0132*** -0.0107*** -0.0128*** -0.0104*** -0.0082*** -0.0139*** -0.0040 -0.0099*** -0.0178*** -0.0153*** -0.0044** -0.0090***
C o n s t a n t                     
Observations  4087 2967  84816  38820  10795  5617 9346  15038  1807 3330 9317  515  3020 4550  765  9162 41182 
 
 
Note: Dependent variables: Own=1 if household owns the house and Woman=1 if the household head is female. Other variables: IncomeHouse= total household income, AgeHead 
and SchoolingHead are age and years of formal education of the household head IncomeWoman, AgeWoman and SchoolingWoman are total income, age and years of formal 
education of the woman of the house, Married=1 if the household head is married, Children=amount of children under 18 in the house. Data for Argentina, Colombia, Nicaragua and 
Uruguay refer to the capital city. Venezuela and El Salvador include both urban and rural areas. For the rest of the countries we consider only households living in urban areas. 
Standard errors in brackets, * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. 
 
 
Table 6. Marginal Effects of the Probability of Homeownership and Woman Household Headship, Bivariate Probit Model 
 Argentina  Bolivia  Brazil  Chile  Colombia Costa Rica Ecuador  El Salvador Guatemala Honduras Mexico Nicaragua Panama  Paraguay Peru  Uruguay  Venezuela
Home ownership                    
Woman  -0.4900*** -0.4818*** -0.5382*** -0.4883*** -0.4273*** -0.4231*** -0.5247*** -0.4877*** -0.4554*** -0.4741*** -0.5251*** -0.4542*** -0.5038*** -0.5063*** -0.5869*** -0.4728*** -0.4918***
IncomeHouse  0.0178*** 0.0407*** 0.0329*** 0.0374*** 0.0194*** 0.0171*** 0.0385*** 0.0118*** 0.0413*** 0.0259*** 0.0375*** 0.0156*** 0.0255*** 0.0084*** 0.0207*** 0.0498*** 0.0026*** 
AgeHead  0.0096*** 0.0143*** 0.0088*** 0.0114*** 0.0166*** 0.0083*** 0.0118*** 0.0091*** 0.0136*** 0.0146*** 0.0126*** 0.0135*** 0.0108*** 0.0094*** 0.0112*** 0.0113*** 0.0093*** 
Married  0.0570***  0.0625***  0.0401*** 0.0874*** 0.1136***  0.0576*** 0.0642*  0.0801***  0.0339**  0.0633  0.0530*** 0.0436*** 0.0398  0.0230 0.0191*** 
SchoolingHead  0.0024  -0.0019  -0.0035***  -0.0109*** 0.0057*** 0.0002   -0.0046***  -0.0027***  -0.0012  -0.0006  -0.0031*  0.0018  0.0011 -0.0082*** -0.0102** 0.0105***   -0.0058***
C o n s t a n t                     
Female headship                    
Own   -0.5762***  -0.5277***  -0.5875***  -0.5501*** -0.5483*** -0.5462*** -0.5446***  -0.5681***  -0.5681***  -0.5690***  -0.5943*** -0.5475*** -0.5699***  -0.5991*** -0.6170*** -0.5571*** -0.5613***
IncomeWoman  0.0506*** 0.0382*** 0.0417*** 0.0262*** 0.0185*** 0.0255*** 0.0366***   0.0265***   0.0265***   0.0305*** 0.0414*** 0.0222*** 0.0282*** 0.0197*** 0.0305*** 0.0507*** 0.0163*** 
AgeWoman  0.0096*** 0.0111*** 0.0092*** 0.0107*** 0.0157*** 0.0073*** 0.0102***   0.0096***   0.0096***   0.0138*** 0.0133*** 0.0173*** 0.0114*** 0.0101*** 0.0098*** 0.0113*** 0.0109*** 
Children  0.0032 -0.0112*** 0.0005*  0.0013 -0.0023*** 0.0020* -0.0007***   -0.0085***   -0.0085  0.0001  -0.0004  0.0001  0.0028  0.0006** 0.0017*** -0.0045  -0.0076***
SchoolingWoman  -0.0038  -0.0021  -0.0045***  -0.0094*** 0.0040*** -0.0051*** -0.0048***  -0.0052***  -0.0053*  -0.0026**  -0.0039*** 0.0014 -0.0002    -0.0109*** -0.0111*** 0.0093*** -0.0084***
C o n s t a n t                     
Observations  4085 2967  84132  38804  10666  5194 9346  15038  1807 3177 9317  515  2990 4550  765  9162 41016 
 
 
Note: Dependent variables: Own=1 if household owns the house and Woman=1 if the household head is female. Other variables: IncomeHouse= total household income, AgeHead 
and SchoolingHead are age and years of formal education of the household head IncomeWoman, AgeWoman and SchoolingWoman are total income, age and years of formal 
education of the woman of the house, Married=1 if the household head is married, Children=amount of children under 18 in the house. Data for Argentina, Colombia, Nicaragua and 
Uruguay refer to the capital city. Venezuela and El Salvador include both urban and rural areas. For the rest of the countries we consider only households living in urban areas. 
Standard errors in brackets, * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%   21
7. Conclusions 
 
Although there is a large literature on the determinants of housing tenure, as well as a large 
literature on discrimination against women, no previous study showed that female-headed 
households—all else being equal—have a lower probability of owning their home. We argue that 
the housing tenure decision and the housing headship decision should not be treated as 
exogenous. Among the variables that enter into the decision of a woman to divorce her husband 
are income-related issues and family life cycle dimensions that also affect the probability of 
owning their house. Similarly, those single women who decide to head their own households are 
likely different than those who choose to continue keep living with their parents. Taking to the 
extreme this argument, those widows who do not remarry and do not move in with other family 
members are likely richer, more self confident, etc. than the “average” widow. If this type of 
endogeneity is not properly accounted, it leads to inconsistent and often counterintuitive results. 
In this paper, we use individual-level data on homeownership from Chile, Honduras and 
Nicaragua to verify the potential problems with household level estimations that do not control 
for headship endogeneity. In these three countries we found evidence that women as a whole 
have a lower probability of owning their home but that certain types of women, single family 
heads, separated or divorced women and in one case also widows, have a higher probability of 
being homeowners. 
Then we proceed to estimate the gender effect in 17 Latin American countries using 
household-level data but also controlling for household head endogeneity with a bivariate probit 
estimation. We found that a naive simple probit model seems to imply that women-headed 
families have a higher probability of owning their home in nine out of the 17countries studied 
and that there are no significant results in six other countries. Once we estimate the bivariate 
probit model we find that female headed families have a lower probability of owning their home 
in all the countries studied. 
With respect to the other variables, as expected, we found that the higher the income of 
the family the higher the probability of owning their home. The higher the income of the woman 
of the house, the higher the probability of having a woman-headed family. The older the 
household head, the higher the probability of being a homeowner and the higher the probability 
of female household headship. Family status variables such as being married have a positive   22
direct effect on the probability of being a homeowner. The only not-so-intuitive results we obtain 
are related to the effect of education of women, but this could be due to the increase in the 
education level of younger cohorts that have  a lower probability of owning their home and a 
lower probability of becoming household heads. 
Finally, poverty is both cause and effect of poor housing conditions. The results of this 
paper are therefore important for poverty reduction policies. Although it does not provide 
immediate policy recommendations to eliminate or reduce homeownership gender biases, it 
completely changes the diagnostic and opens the window for exploring at the country level the 
institutional determinants of this situation and the eventual remedies. 
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Appendix 
 
Table A1. Data Sources 
Country Survey  Year Source 
Argentina  Encuesta Permanente de Hogares  2003 Instituto Nacional de Estadística y Censos 
Bolivia  Encuesta Integrada de Hogares  2002 Instituto Nacional de Estadística 
Brazil  Pesquisa Nacional por Amostra de Domicilios  2003 Instituto Brasileiro de Geografia e Estatística 
Chile CASEN  2003 Ministerio de Planificación 
Colombia  Encuesta Continua de Hogares  2003 Departamento Administrativo Nacional de 
Estadística 
Costa Rica  Encuesta de Hogares de Propósitos Múltiples  2003 Instituto Nacional de Estadística y Censos 
Ecuador  Encuesta de Calidad de Vida  2003 Instituto Nacional de Estadística y Censos 
El Salvador  Encuesta de Hogares de Propósitos Múltiples  2003 Dirección General de Estadística y Censos 
Guatemala  Encuesta Nacional de Empleo e Ingresos  2003 Instituto Nacional de Estadística 
Honduras  Encuesta Permanente de Hogares de 
Propósitos Múltiples 
2003 Instituto Nacional de Estadística 
Mexico  Encuesta Nacional de Ingresos y Gastos de 
los Hogares 
2004 Instituto Nacional de Estadística, Geografía e 
Informática 
Nicaragua  Encuesta Nacional de Hogares sobre Medición 
de Niveles de Vida 
2001 Instituto Nacional de Estadística y Censos 
Panama  Encuesta de Hogares  2003 Dirección de Estadística y Censo 
Paraguay  Encuesta Permanente de Hogares  2003 Dirección General de Estadística, Encuestas y 
Censos 
Peru  Encuesta Nacional de Hogares sobre Medición 
de Niveles de Vida 
2000 Instituto Nacional de Estadística e Informática 
Uruguay  Encuesta Continua de Hogares  2004 Instituto Nacional de Estadística 
Venezuela  Encuesta de Hogares por Muestreo  2003 Instituto Nacional de Estadística 
   26
 
Table A2. Determinants of the Probability of Homeownership 
 Chile  Honduras  Nicaragua 



















Woman  -0.075  0.174  -0.270  -0.034  -0.227  0.271 
  [0.012]***  [0.015]*** [0.025]***   [0.043]  [0.028]***  [0.057]***
Woman-Single-Not  household  head   -0.186    -0.701    -1.051  
  [0.025]***    [0.060]***    [0.092]***  
Woman-Single-  household  head   0.031    0.479    0.735  
   [0.034]     [0.059]***     [0.257]***  
Woman  Separated   0.125    0.289    0.351  
  [0.030]***    [0.075]***    [0.047]***  
Woman  Couple   -0.085    -0.379    -0.380  
  [0.015]***    [0.031]***    [0.035]***  
Woman  Widow   -0.067    0.068    0.232  
   [0.026]**     [0.072]     [0.070]***  
Income  0.201 0.200 0.000 0.012 0.010 0.005 0.076 0.071 0.006 
 [0.008]*** [0.008]*** [0.000]*** [0.001]*** [0.001]*** [0.002]** [0.007]*** [0.007]*** [0.005] 
Age  0.015 0.015 0.025 0.041 0.037 0.031 0.042 0.037 0.022 
 [0.000]*** [0.000]*** [0.000]*** [0.001]*** [0.001]*** [0.001]*** [0.001]*** [0.001]*** [0.002]***
Married  0.073 0.087 0.361 0.272 0.397 0.382 0.292 0.462 0.313 
 [0.012]*** [0.014]*** [0.013]*** [0.027]*** [0.030]*** [0.039]*** [0.030]*** [0.035]*** [0.051]***
Schooling  0.050 0.049 -0.037 0.017 0.016 -0.025 0.009 0.009 -0.009 
 [0.001]*** [0.001]*** [0.002]*** [0.003]*** [0.003]*** [0.005]*** [0.003]*** [0.003]*** [0.005]* 
Constant  -2.726 -2.698 -0.650 -2.855 -2.730 -0.786 -2.306 -2.207 -0.400 
 [0.023]*** [0.024]*** [0.027]*** [0.040]*** [0.042]*** [0.068]*** [0.036]*** [0.037]*** [0.082]***
Observations  147056  147056  67954  29212  29212 6275 15703  15703 4169 
Note: In columns A and B Own=1 if individual owns the house, Wom=1 for females, Married==1 if the individual is married, 
Schooling is years of  formal education. In column C Own=1 if someone in the household owns the house, Wom=1 if the household 
head is female, Age, Married and Schooling refers to the household head. Standard errors in brackets * significant at 10%; ** 
significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%   27
Table A3. Determinants of the Probability of Homeownership, Probit Model  
 Argentina  Bolivia  Brazil  Chile  Colombia Costa Rica Ecuador  El Salvador Guatemala Honduras Mexico Nicaragua Panama  Paraguay Peru  Uruguay  Venezuela
Woman  0.126 0.024 -0.122 0.199 0.141 0.318 -0.080 0.077 0.061 0.068 0.099 0.212 0.188 0.064 -0.143 0.118  0.199 
  [0.052]** [0.062] [0.010]***  [0.019]*** [0.029]*** [0.051]*** [0.031]**  [0.025]*** [0.078]  [0.054] [0.029]*** [0.151] [0.057]*** [0.046] [0.096]  [0.027]*** [0.017]*** 
IncomeHouse  0.000 0.085 0.040 0.209 0.060 0.025 0.109 -0.007 0.129 0.036 0.138 0.070 0.116 -0.005 0.018 0.140 -0.009 
  [0.007]  [0.021]*** [0.004]*** [0.008]*** [0.006]*** [0.009]*** [0.011]*** [0.005]  [0.029]*** [0.020]*  [0.011]*** [0.033]**  [0.017]*** [0.010] [0.015]  [0.014]*** [0.001]*** 
AgeHead  0.024 0.032 0.022 0.028 0.043 0.023 0.031 0.017 0.032 0.039 0.034 0.036 0.025 0.027 0.027 0.026  0.024 
  [0.001]*** [0.002]*** [0.000]*** [0.001]*** [0.001]*** [0.001]*** [0.001]*** [0.001]*** [0.002]*** [0.002]*** [0.001]*** [0.005]*** [0.002]*** [0.001]*** [0.003]*** [0.001]*** [0.001]*** 
Married  0.455 0.390    0.375 0.425 0.563    0.422 0.339 0.426 0.467 0.442 0.394 0.526 0.260 0.375  0.228 
  [0.047]***  [0.053]***  [0.016]*** [0.029]*** [0.041]***  [0.025]*** [0.068]*** [0.052]***  [0.026]*** [0.159]*** [0.057]*** [0.044]*** [0.082]*** [0.025]*** [0.016]*** 
SchoolingHead  0.024 -0.014 -0.004 -0.053 0.025 0.014 -0.004 -0.003 0.002 0.004 -0.009 0.011 0.008 -0.021 -0.045 0.031  -0.023 
  [0.006]*** [0.005]*** [0.001]*** [0.002]*** [0.003]*** [0.005]**  [0.003]  [0.002]  [0.007]  [0.006]  [0.003]*** [0.016]  [0.006]  [0.005]*** [0.008]*** [0.003]*** [0.002]*** 
Constant  -1.058 -1.949 -0.511 -3.230 -3.329 -0.998 -1.715 -0.347 -2.477 -1.818 -2.480 -1.527 -1.566 -0.601 -0.495 -2.722  -0.043 
  [0.109]*** [0.160]*** [0.025]*** [0.095]*** [0.097]*** [0.125]*** [0.078]*** [0.050]*** [0.234]*** [0.176]*** [0.097]*** [0.368]*** [0.143]*** [0.148]*** [0.160]*** [0.122]*** [0.034] 
Observations  5222 3309  92195  42306  12236  5752  10452  16808  1983 3628  17318 548  3363 5035 1592  18338  45976 
 
 
Note: Dependent variable: Own=1 if household owns the house. Independent variables: Woman=1 if the household head is female, IncomeHouse= total household income, 
AgeHead is the age of the household head and SchoolingHead is years of education of the household head, Married=1 if the household head is married, Children=amount of 
children under 18 in the house. Data for Argentina, Colombia, Nicaragua and Uruguay refer to the capital city. Venezuela and El Salvador include both urban and rural areas. For the 




Table A4. Determinants of the Probability of Female Headship, Probit Model 
 Argentina  Bolivia  Brazil  Chile  Colombia Costa Rica Ecuador  El Salvador Guatemala Honduras Mexico Nicaragua Panama  Paraguay Peru  Uruguay  Venezuela
Own  -0.285 -0.430 -0.280 -0.231 -0.355 -0.167 -0.287 -0.206 -0.298 -0.385 -0.436 -0.285 -0.287 -0.432 -0.415 -0.303  -0.051 
  [0.056]*** [0.063]*** [0.012]*** [0.018]*** [0.030]*** [0.053]*** [0.033]*** [0.027]*** [0.078]*** [0.058]*** [0.032]*** [0.168]*  [0.059]*** [0.051]*** [0.125]*** [0.034]*** [0.019]*** 
IncomeWoman  0.229 0.219 0.189 0.118 0.098 0.137 0.220 0.144 0.228 0.158 0.205 0.109 0.137 0.090 0.169 0.217  0.065 
  [0.009]*** [0.012]*** [0.002]*** [0.002]*** [0.003]*** [0.004]*** [0.007]*** [0.003]*** [0.015]*** [0.008]*** [0.010]*** [0.018]*** [0.010]*** [0.004]*** [0.021]*** [0.007]*** [0.001]*** 
AgeWoman  0.022 0.023 0.023 0.023 0.029 0.021 0.026 0.024 0.028 0.028 0.028 0.045 0.027 0.019 0.017 0.020  0.026 
  [0.002]*** [0.002]*** [0.000]*** [0.001]*** [0.001]*** [0.002]*** [0.001]*** [0.001]*** [0.003]*** [0.002]*** [0.001]*** [0.005]*** [0.002]*** [0.002]*** [0.004]*** [0.001]*** [0.001]*** 
Children  -0.008 -0.158 -0.016 -0.013 -0.056 0.034  0.000 -0.099 -0.053 -0.026 -0.063 -0.032 -0.012 -0.024 0.026 -0.100  -0.063 
  [0.021] [0.019]***  [0.004]***  [0.007]* [0.012]*** [0.015]** [0.009] [0.006]*** [0.030]* [0.016]* [0.011]*** [0.026]  [0.018]  [0.013]* [0.030]  [0.015]*** [0.003]*** 
SchoolingWoman  -0.038 -0.023 -0.028 -0.034 -0.019 -0.055 -0.036 -0.036 -0.038 -0.025 -0.037 -0.011 -0.028 -0.049 -0.051 -0.012  -0.025 
  [0.007]*** [0.006]*** [0.001]*** [0.002]*** [0.003]*** [0.006]*** [0.004]*** [0.003]*** [0.008]*** [0.006]*** [0.003]*** [0.015]  [0.007]*** [0.005]*** [0.012]*** [0.004]*** [0.002]*** 
Constant  -2.021 -1.974 -1.906 -2.165 -2.144 -2.054 -2.063 -1.387 -2.617 -2.155 -2.360 -2.207 -1.645 -1.275 -1.449 -2.596  -1.455 
  [0.140]*** [0.143]*** [0.023]*** [0.044]*** [0.077]*** [0.112]*** [0.073]*** [0.055]*** [0.171]*** [0.124]*** [0.100]*** [0.322]*** [0.137]*** [0.102]*** [0.244]*** [0.096]*** [0.037]*** 
Observations  4087 2967  84816  38820  10795  5617 9346  15038  1807 3330 9317  515  3020 4550  765  9162 41182 
 
 
Note: Dependent variable: Woman=1 if household the head is female. Independent variables: Own=1 if household owns the house. IncomeWoman, AgeWoman and 
SchoolingWoman are total income, age and years of formal education of the woman of the house, Married=1 if the household head is married, Children=amount of children under 18 
in the house. Data for Argentina, Colombia, Nicaragua and Uruguay refer to the capital city. Venezuela and El Salvador include both urban and rural areas. For the rest of the 
countries we consider only households living in urban areas. Standard errors in brackets, * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%   28
 
Table A5. Determinants of the Probability of Homeownership and Woman Household Headship, Bivariate Probit Model 
 Argentina  Bolivia  Brazil  Chile  Colombia Costa Rica Ecuador  El Salvador Guatemala Honduras Mexico Nicaragua Panama  Paraguay Peru  Uruguay  Venezuela
Home ownership                    
Woman  -1.379 -1.311 -1.527 -1.340 -1.132 -1.175 -1.436 -1.350 -1.223 -1.277 -1.471 -1.413 -1.399 -1.465 -1.640 -1.303  -1.493 
  [0.033]*** [0.044]*** [0.007]*** [0.012]*** [0.018]*** [0.035]*** [0.021]*** [0.024]*** [0.075]*** [0.048]*** [0.029]*** [0.136]*** [0.040]*** [0.042]*** [0.118]*** [0.042]*** [0.015]*** 
IncomeHouse  0.052 0.103 0.096 0.105 0.049 0.053 0.099 0.033 0.104 0.069 0.102 0.050 0.071 0.025 0.058 0.134  0.008 
  [0.010]*** [0.009]*** [0.002]*** [0.007]*** [0.002]*** [0.009]*** [0.006]*** [0.004]*** [0.012]*** [0.021]*** [0.013]*** [0.015]*** [0.012]*** [0.002]*** [0.013]*** [0.010]*** [0.001]*** 
AgeHead  0.028 0.036 0.026 0.032 0.042 0.026 0.030 0.025 0.034 0.039 0.034 0.043 0.030 0.028 0.031 0.030  0.030 
  [0.001]*** [0.002]*** [0.000]*** [0.000]*** [0.001]*** [0.001]*** [0.001]*** [0.001]*** [0.002]*** [0.002]*** [0.001]*** [0.004]*** [0.002]*** [0.001]*** [0.003]*** [0.001]*** [0.000]*** 
Married  0.167 0.158    0.112 0.220 0.347    0.161 0.163 0.213 0.092 0.208 0.148 0.129 0.111 0.062  0.062 
  [0.020]***  [0.046]***  [0.011]*** [0.010]*** [0.040]***  [0.022]*** [0.076]**  [0.053]***  [0.031]*** [0.163]  [0.008]*** [0.030]*** [0.120] [0.044]  [0.016]*** 
SchoolingHead  0.007 -0.005 -0.010 -0.031 0.014  0.001 -0.012 -0.007 -0.003 -0.002 -0.008 0.006  0.003 -0.024 -0.028 0.028  -0.019 
  [0.006]  [0.004] [0.001]***  [0.002]*** [0.002]*** [0.004] [0.002]*** [0.002]*** [0.006]  [0.006] [0.004]** [0.012]  [0.004] [0.004]*** [0.010]*** [0.003]*** [0.001]*** 
Constant  -0.948 -1.891 -0.710 -1.847 -2.421 -1.044 -1.267 -0.498 -1.982 -1.611 -1.486 -1.223 -1.005 -0.430 -0.753 -2.353  -0.108 
  [0.115]*** [0.108]*** [0.019]*** [0.084]*** [0.064]*** [0.122]*** [0.041]*** [0.041]*** [0.143]*** [0.158]*** [0.106]*** [0.267]*** [0.095]*** [0.082]*** [0.210]*** [0.105]*** [0.030]*** 
Female headship                    
Own  -1.613 -1.661 -1.640 -1.562 -1.561 -1.608 -1.604 -1.572 -1.543 -1.608 -1.668 -1.542 -1.578 -1.683 -1.787 -1.537  -1.569 
  [0.037]*** [0.045]*** [0.009]*** [0.011]*** [0.019]*** [0.040]*** [0.029]*** [0.016]*** [0.049]*** [0.040]*** [0.022]*** [0.179]*** [0.035]*** [0.032]*** [0.086]*** [0.021]*** [0.014]*** 
IncomeWoman  0.145 0.119 0.116 0.078 0.049 0.088 0.108 0.071 0.125 0.084 0.107 0.057 0.075 0.053 0.090 0.134  0.043 
  [0.008]*** [0.010]*** [0.002]*** [0.001]*** [0.002]*** [0.004]*** [0.006]*** [0.003]*** [0.012]*** [0.006]*** [0.009]*** [0.017]*** [0.009]*** [0.003]*** [0.019]*** [0.005]*** [0.001]*** 
AgeWoman  0.028 0.035 0.026 0.032 0.041 0.025 0.030 0.026 0.035 0.038 0.034 0.045 0.030 0.027 0.029 0.030  0.029 
  [0.002]*** [0.002]*** [0.000]*** [0.000]*** [0.001]*** [0.001]*** [0.001]*** [0.001]*** [0.002]*** [0.002]*** [0.001]*** [0.004]*** [0.002]*** [0.001]*** [0.003]*** [0.001]*** [0.000]*** 
Children  0.009 -0.035 0.002 0.004 -0.006 0.007 -0.002 -0.023 -0.001 0.000 -0.001 0.000 0.007 0.002 0.005 -0.012 -0.020 
  [0.016] [0.006]*** [0.001]*  [0.003] [0.001]*** [0.004]* [0.000]*** [0.002]*** [0.003]  [0.003]  [0.007]  [0.001]  [0.006] [0.001]**  [0.002]*** [0.012] [0.002]*** 
SchoolingWoman  -0.011 -0.006 -0.013 -0.028 0.010 -0.018 -0.014 -0.014 -0.010 -0.007 -0.010 0.004 -0.001 -0.029 -0.033 0.024  -0.022 
  [0.007]  [0.005] [0.001]***  [0.001]*** [0.002]*** [0.004]*** [0.002]*** [0.002]*** [0.006]* [0.003]**  [0.003]*** [0.012]  [0.007] [0.004]*** [0.010]*** [0.003]*** [0.001]*** 
Constant  -1.126 -1.498 -0.699 -1.291 -1.902 -0.900 -1.095 -0.478 -1.739 -1.370 -1.307 -1.168 -0.826 -0.507 -0.691 -2.023  -0.328 
  [0.131]*** [0.097]*** [0.018]*** [0.029]*** [0.052]*** [0.061]*** [0.030]*** [0.045]*** [0.128]*** [0.102]*** [0.081]*** [0.283]*** [0.130]*** [0.068]*** [0.199]*** [0.080]*** [0.032]*** 
Observations  4085 2967  84132  38804  10666  5194 9346  15038  1807 3177 9317  515  2990 4550  765  9162 41016 
 
 
Note: Dependent variables: Own=1 if household owns the house and Woman=1 if household the head is female. IncomeHouse= total household income, AgeHead and 
SchoolingHead are age and years of formal education of  the household head IncomeWoman, AgeWoman and SchoolingWoman are total income, age and years of formal 
education of  the woman of the house, Married=1 if the household head is married, Children=amount of children under 18 in the house. Data for Argentina, Colombia, Nicaragua and 
Uruguay refer to the capital city. Venezuela and El Salvador include both urban and rural areas. For the rest of the countries we consider only households living in urban areas. 
Standard errors in brackets, * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 